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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that information technology can have a 
significant impact on organizational flexibility. Information 
technology (IT) contributes to flexibility by 1) changing the 
nature of organization boundaries and the time when work 
occurs 2) altering the nature and pace of work and 3) helping 
firms respond to changing market conditions. But, there are 
also aspects of technology which can decrease flexibility, and 
there may be second-order impacts of flexibility that are not 
easily predicted. Examples to illustrate the impact of 
information technology on two industries and three companies 
are presented. The paper concludes that management should 
consider the use of information technology to increase 
flexibility and suggests strategies for implementing ilexible 
systems. 
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THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
ON ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY* 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been estimated that over a third of capital 
expenditures in the United States are devoted to technology, 
but there has been little concrete evidence that this 
investment has improved the effectiveness of organizations. 
How can information technology (IT) contribute to 
organizational effectiveness? One measure of effectiveness 
is flexibility [I]. 
Flexibility is the ability to adapt to new or changing 
requirements. In a manufacturing firm, Hall [2] explained: 
"plants should be capable of switching quickly from one 
product to another, or from one part to another ... almost 
instantly." Swamidass and Newel1 wrote: "Flexibility offers 
the capability to cope with environmental uncertaintyw [3]. 
Severance and Passino concur: "Flexibility enables the 
organization to adapt to current market realities and to 
react appropriately as market forces change over timew [4]. 
tt~lexibility provides the means to achieve the ends of 
increased growth and resource acquisitionw [5]. 
All of these observations suggest thatfleribility is the ability to adapt when 
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confronted with new circumstances; a flexible organization defends quickly against 
threats and moves rapidly to take advantage of opportunities. Flexibility provides the 
organization with the ability to adapt to change and respond quickly to market forces 
and uncertainty in its environment. 
The purpose of this paper is 1) to illustrate the 
impact of information technology on organizational 
flexibility and 2) explore the implications of that impact 
for management. 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
IT refers to hardware, software, procedures, personnel, 
and data employed in the production, dissemination, and 
utilization of information, both formal and informal, in an 
organization [63. While traditionally IT has included only 
wformal"f information systems, such as reporting systems 
generated by a database, increasingly IT is used to 
facilitate informal interpersonal communication. The key 
technologies include computers, computer-controlled devices, 
and telecommunications networks; also included are 
electronic mail (E-mail), teleconferencing, voice mail, and 
facsimile transmission. 
IT not only consists of tangible pieces of equipment 
and programs; but also represents the capacity of the 
organization to produce, disseminate, and digest 
information. IT has been used in a number of ways including 
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the mechanization of information processing, the 
augmentation of knowledge work, and the support of 
coordination in the organization. 
Significant IT investment is for basic mechanization of 
the records of production and distribution of goods and 
services (e.g., invoices) or for actions like themselves, 
electronic money transfer. Technology is also used for 
manufacturing (such as CAD/CAM) and computer-integrated 
manufacturing (CIM). A centralized database enables 
production and dissemination of information for management 
control as a by-product of mechanization. 
IT also supports individual workers, Drucker [7] 
identified "knowledge worktt as a specifically human 
activity, distinct from physical labor which could be 
automated. The notion of augmentation was first defined by 
Englebart [8] as "increasing the capability of a man (sic) 
to approach a complex problem situation, gain comprehension 
to suit his particular needs, and to derive solutions to 
problems." Today, personal computers are used widely by 
individuals to augment knowledge work. 
IT increases the ease of connection between 
individuals, organizational units, and even different 
organizations [9,10]. Applications such as electronic mail, 
voice messaging, and facsimile transmission facilitate the 
communication and coordination of information required for 
organizational processing. Some terms used for this class 
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of applications are: interpersonal computing [Ill, 
coordination technology [12,13], groupware [14], and 
computer supported groups [15]. 
Information Technology and Flexibility 
We argue that information technology can make a major 
contribution to organizational flexibility. See Figure 1. 
< Insert Figure 1 > 
We do not claim that increased flexibility has been gained, 
or will be gained, by every organization employing 
technology. Examples cited later in the paper provide 
evidence to support our primary contention that information 
technology has the potential to dramatically alter 
organizational flexibility. 
How can IT contribute to adaptability and change? IT 
alters flexibility in three major ways: 
1. IT can alter the time and place of work, 
generally by changing boundaries on where tasks 
are accomplished and removing constraints on when 
tasks are performed. 
2. IT affects the nature and pace of work; most 
often it speeds up the processing of information. 
3. IT enables the firm to respond quickly to 
changing market conditions. 
~ornrnunications technology helps remove the constraints of 
time and place in decision-making [16]. Technology removes 
organizational boundaries by enabling easy asynchronous 
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communication between different locations so that time of 
day and time zone are not a constraint. 
Technology speeds the processing of information so that 
timely decisions can be made, tasks can be performed rapidly 
. to take advantage of new opportunities, and the firm can 
respond to changing market conditions. Technology is the 
glfactory" for many financial services; speed and processing 
power are required to provide the service or product to the 
customer. By using flexible manufacturing systems IT can 
quickly reconfigure manufacturing lines. 
The Flexibility Paradox 
Cameron [17] suggested that the modern corporation 
encounters many paradoxical situations when adapting to 
turbulent conditions. The difference between organizational 
and technological flexibility is one such paradox. 
Technology can contribute to organizational flexibility, but 
IT itself is often considered inflexible, because the 
technology that provides flexibility soon becomes old and 
hard to maintain, and the organization tends to become more 
inflexible over time. Many flexible systems are complex and 
difficult to modify. It took one airline over two years to 
track frequent flyer mileage in its reservations system; in 
the meantime, passengers had to paste a scannable label on 
their ticket coupon to get mileage credit for a flight. 
* There are many reasons that IT is complex; the simple 
need to interface computers and communications devices 
* 
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requires designers to confront a myriad of different 
interfaces and formats. Major systems include thousands, 
and even millions, of lines of computer code; a small error 
can cause major disruptions in a system. Making changes to 
working programs often has unanticipated consequences to 
some other place in the program. A complete discussion of 
the complexity of IT is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however, it seems safe to conclude that complexity reduces 
the flexibility of specific IT applications. 
Figure 1 suggests that IT can create an unintended 
decrease in flexibility in two ways: 
1. By increasing the time, effort, and cost to change 
systems; and 
2. By increasing the time, effort and cost to change 
workflows and organization structure. 
Leading organizations deal with decreases in 
flexibility by changes and improvements in the technology 
(e.g., reservations systems undergo constant technological 
updating and change). Hopper [I83 argued that the movement 
toward very powerful, open systems will make it possible to 
implement and modify complex technology more easily in the 
future. 
Second-Order Effects 
Figure 1 shows that there may be second-order effects 
from increasing organizational flexibility through the use 
of IT. These second-order effects arise primarily from 
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attempts to increase flexibility, but may also be influenced 
by the decreased flexibility previously discussed. Second- 
order effects can occur in three major areas: 
1. The organization becomes more dependent on 
information technology. 
2. The use of IT may stimulate unanticipated responses 
from competitors, customers, the government, and other 
affected individuals or groups. 
3. The organization may be faced with managing greater 
complexity. 
There is little doubt that firms have become, and are 
becoming, more dependent on technology. Information 
technology runs the airlines; they are unable to make 
reservations, assign seats, and load planes if their 
computers and communications systems are not operating 
properly. 
An innovating firm may develop new uses of IT that 
offer flexibility but stimulate unanticipated responses. 
For example, some customers have reacted negatively to 
program trading by brokerage firms; after the 1987 stock 
market crash, one insurance company threatened to stop doing 
business with brokerage firms engaging in program trading. 
The Exchanges invented **circuit breakersw partially because 
flexible information technology was blamed for causing 
excessive price and volume movements. 
If employees can work where and when they please, their 
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actions can be more difficult for management to coordinate. 
speeding up the pace of work can also increase stress for 
managers pressured for a rapid response. 
Outcomes 
Figure 1 indicates that flexibility, mediated by 
second-order effects, will lead to an outcome, either 
positive or negative. Most firms who use IT to increase 
flexibility hope to generate a positive outcome. There are 
examples, however, where the net outcome of positive and 
negative impacts is in doubt. 
It should also be pointed out that the evaluation of 
what is positive and negative depends very much on the 
observer's position. The chairman of American Airlines has 
a much different view of the outcome of computerized 
reservations systems than the chairman of TWA. Individual 
investors may have a different view of Stock Exchange 
trading systems than the institutional investor. 
Flexibility for Whom? 
Information technology may increase flexibility for the 
customers or suppliers, as well as for the firm that 
developed it. Although the use of E-mail within the firm 
primarily benefits the organization installing the system, 
it also provides added flexibility to customers who use the 
system. But, giving customers added flexibility may reduce 
the supplier's flexibility since the supplier is now forced 
to respond more quickly to messages from the customer. In 
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financial services, building more processing power provides 
benefits for the developer who can generate more revenue, 
and it provides more flexibility for the customer who can 
react faster. 
Thus, any benefits of increased flexibility accrue to 
both the organization implementing the IT and related 
organizations and individuals like customers and suppliers. 
The flexibility of the implementing firm may not be 
increased dramatically from some applications of technology, 
however, the technology has increased flexibility for the 
industry involved. In the remainder of the paper, we 
discuss flexibility regardless of whether the greatest 
change affects the implementer or the others who interact 
with the implementing organization. 
Causality 
Any study of impacts has to deal with the question of 
causality. We argue that information technology has had an 
impact on organizational flexibility, but we cannot prove 
that program trading works only because of stock exchange 
electronic order routing systems or computer programs that 
scan for arbitrage opportunities. It is possible that 
program traders wanting to buy or sell a basket of stocks 
could use preprinted trading tickets delivered with great 
speed to floor traders. Again, the analysis of 
technological impacts is based on our interpretation of the 
literature reviewed for this paper and from personal 
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experience. The reader is cautioned to consider other 
possible causal explanations for the data presented. 
~ecreasing Flexibility: Second-Order Effects and Outcomes 
In the following discussion, we do not specifically 
address instances of decreased flexibility because, given 
today's technology, we expect almost without exception that 
firms will pay a price in time, effort, and cost to change 
systems and workflows. The technology has not become 
sufficiently flexible itself, or sufficiently open, to make 
significant changes easy to accomplish. 
We shall discuss selected second-order effects and 
outcomes in the examples below. In each case, not all of 
the second-order effects in Figure 1 are evident. For 
example, the kind of videoconferencing discussed for East 
Coast Hi Tech creates far less dependence on technology than 
does an airline reservations system. 
METHODOLOGY 
The remainder of this paper discusses evidence to 
support the model of IT and flexibility in Figure 1. In an 
effort to provide the broadest possible support, evidence is 
drawn from two industries and three firms. Table 1 presents 
the source of information for each industry or company in 
the paper; data come from either key published reports 
and/or field studies. If that these data sources are 
consistent with the model it means only that there is 
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support for model; the evidence does not prove the posited 
relationships posited. Other researchers might have 
differing interpretations of the data, and the reader is 
encouraged to review the sources in Table 1 to evaluate the 
following arguments below. 
< Insert Table 1 > 
THE IMPACT OF IT IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Stage One 
American Airlines, motivated by a need to handle 
increasing passenger loads and to provide better customer 
service [18,19], developed the first fully Computerized 
Reservations System (CRS) in 1961 to allow the airline's 
agents to make reservations for passengers. 
As shown in Table 2, the first stage CRS removed the 
boundary created by the manual reservations process. 
< Insert Table 2 > 
Instead of allocating seats to offices for sale, an agent 
had information locally on all seats available. The 
boundaries around the reservations process moved from a 
central department to each distributed agent. As 
reservations could be made 24 hours per day and confirmed 
instantaneously, the CRS created more flexibility for 
passengers, allowing the airline to react more quickly to 
market changes. The reservation systems maintained easily 
processed data on load factors and passenger demand; the 
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airline could use these data in planning flight schedules. 
Stage Two 
~uring the late 1960s and early 1970s, the airline 
industry, stimulated by pending de-regulation, talked of a 
single, cooperative reservations system that would be 
distributed to retail travel agents [19]. In 1976, united 
and American Airlines began to market their systems to 
travel agents. 
Travel agents could now make airline reservations 
through a direct connection to the airline computer, without 
needing to contact an airline reservations staff member by 
telephone. In the first stage of CRS automation, the 
reservation process boundary was with the airline's agent; 
the second stage moved it to the travel agent. See Table 1. 
As the systems matured, the travel agent was able to 
provide boarding passes as well as tickets, eliminating the 
need for the passenger to wait in line for a seat assignment 
and boarding pass at the airport. By moving part of the 
enplanement process from the airport to the travel agentst 
office, the system altered the boundaries of airport 
operations and speeded the boarding process for the 
passenger. Some agents began to offer 24 hour travel 
assistance for any customers who needed rerouting while on a 
trip. 
Because it took far less time to make a reservation for 
a customer, retail automation altered the nature and pace of 
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work for the travel agent. In addition, since all of the 
CRS systems include ticket printers in the agentst office, 
there were significant gains in agent productivity when 
tickets were printed by the computer rather than by hand. 
The stage 2 reservations systems furnished the data for 
yield management programs that scan the reservations 
database to compare future bookings with historical 
patterns, thus providing the ultimate in market response. 
The program calls attention to any price that is off the 
normal pace based on flight time, cities served, day of the 
week, and nature of the market. Then, pricing specialists 
can revise the price structure for the flight and/or adjust 
advertising to maximize the yield (revenue generated) from 
the flight. 
For example, a reservations system might show that the 
Friday afternoon flight from New York to Boston has only ten 
reservations a week before departure. Few discount seats 
are made available, however, because a computer-generated 
history predicts that most reservations will be made on the 
day of departure. 
The Impact of Flexibility 
Over the past thirty years, the airline reservation 
systems have had four major impacts: 
1. Better customer service. 
There is no question that reservations systems make it 
more convenient for customers to use airlines. Travel 
agencies can quickly check the availability of flights 
and shop for lower fares for customers. Individuals 
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with access to personal computers can make reservations 
by accessing EAASY SABRE through Compuserve or Prodigy. 
2. Direct revenue generation. 
It was estimated that in 1985 Sabre earned $143 million 
on revenues of $336 million and contributed more than 
$2 per share to American's earnings, about one third of 
~merican's total earnings and its highest margin 
business [19,20]. When AMR Corporation (American's 
parent) announced it would consider bids for selling 
shares in Sabre, Wall Street valued the system at $1.5 
billion. At the time, AMR's market value was $2.9 
indicating that Sabre had grown to slightly exceed 
~merican's core business in value [21]. 
3. Less flexibility for the industry. 
These systems make it extremely expensive for non-CRS 
carriers to enter the CRS business. A new airline has 
a tremendous barrier to overcome if it wishes to enjoy 
the flexibility of a modern CRS. Donald Burr, founder 
of People Express, laid much of the blame for the 
demise of his airline on its inability to utilize CRS 
technology. 
4. Transformation of the structure of the airlines and 
their information services organizations. 
The major airlines have created subsidiaries from their 
reservations units. While it was a takeover target, 
United sold half its Covia CRS subsidiary, in which it 
had invested an estimated $250 to $300 million, to a 
consortium of European airlines (KLM, ~wissair, and 
British Airways) and US Air for $500 million. Prior to 
the sale, United had already agreed to form an alliance 
with the European airlines to develop a system for 
European agency automation. When Texas Air, which had 
entered into a similar alliance with Air France, 
Lufthansa, Iberia, and SAS, had problems, this second 
alliance turned to American ~irlines for assistance in 
1990. The sale of part of the American Airlines Sabre 
system to Delta was recently disapproved by the U.S. 
government which feared the power of the combined 
systems. ~merican has rebounded by agreeing to develop 
a reservations system for Aeroflot to serve Eastern 
Europe. New organizational boundaries have been 
created (the CRS subsidiaries) and new strategic 
alliances formed as a result of reservations 
automation. 
second-Order Effects and Outcomes 
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Table 2 shows some of the second-order effects from 
airline CRS. We have already discussed the extreme 
technological dependence the airlines have on this and 
related technology for their operations. Competitors and 
the government have also provided unanticipated responses to 
these systems. The Department of Transportation has issued 
regulations to try and create impartiality in the systems. 
In August of 1992, the US Congress passed a bill to force 
United and American to reprogram their systems to make it as 
easy to book flights on other airlines as on their own. 
Is the net outcome from airline CRS positive or 
negative? From the standpoint of the CRS vendors, the 
systems have been extremely beneficial. A sign of their 
effectiveness is that competitors without the systems lodge 
constant complaints against their use. For the passenger, 
it is much easier to make reservations, and even to shop for 
fares. But, this advantage is offset by yield management 
programs that make obtaining a seat at a given price a bit 
of a gambling exercise. 
In addition, since CRS raise barriers to entry, they 
reduce competition and customer power. The CRS help 
airlines and travel agents deal with the complexities of hub 
and spoke systems that require more flight segments than 
direct, origin-to-destination flights. A carrier with a 
dominant position at a hub can hold the customer hostage to 
high prices and possibly inferior service. 
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THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
Due to intensive information processing requirements, 
the securities industry, which consists of individual and 
institutional investors, brokerage and financial services 
firms and a group of exchanges, has made major investments 
in information systems and services. 
Automation in the securities industry has focused on 
proprietary systems designed for a specific purpose. With 
the exception of the exchanges, most securities systems have 
had their primary impact on the firm that developed the 
application. Exchange applications, of course, affect all 
of those who use a particular exchange, e.g., national and 
international trading systems, such as NASDAQ (over-the- 
counter stocks) and Instinet (a computerized exchange owned 
by Reuters) [22] . 
Back Office Systems 
Organizations first adopted information technology for 
processing large volumes of transactions. A brokerage firm 
must keep track of customers' accounts; the stock exchanges 
and clearing firms must clear all of the day's transactions, 
Large, back office computer systems give firms the ability 
to process huge volumes of transactions and meet stringent 
time limits. 
Once a brokerage firm has information about the 
customer in a database, it can make that information 
available to a broker in a branch office to supplement the 
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quotation information typically purchased from an outside 
vendor, such as, ADP or ILX. The technology removes 
boundaries on the availability of account information, which 
is now easily available at the broker's desk rather than 
from a bulky printout or through a phone call to a central 
processing site. 
The back office systems contributed to extending the 
time the Exchanges can be open for trading. In the 1960s, 
inadequate capacity led to early closings of the New York 
Stock Exchange so that securities firms could catch up on 
transactions* processing; today systems are in place to 
eliminate this time constraint. The back office systems 
also accomplish one of their major objectives; they greatly 
speed the processing of customer trades. 
The availability of customer information on-line meant 
that the broker could serve the retail customer better. The 
brokerage firm has become more responsive to its customers 
and better able to market new products and services. 
Trading Systems 
Faced with steadily increasing volume and concerns 
about their ability to complete trades in sufficient time, 
major exchanges have undertaken different programs of 
automation. The NASDAQ system provides an electronic market 
for over-the-counter stocks for the U.S. and several foreign 
countries [23]. Reuters, which handles about 30% of the 
world's foreign exchange transactions over its financial 
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network [24], offers an electronic market in a number of 
stocks with its Instinet subsidiary [25]. 
SuperDot (Designated Order Turnaround System), 
developed by the New York Stock Exchange to directly route 
orders to specialists and avoid the floor broker, is 
available for trades of up to 30,099 shares and limit orders 
of 99,999 shares [26]. 
The impact of information technology on flexibility of 
the trading process is dramatic. See Table 1. Without 
using a floor broker, brokers are able to route orders to 
the specialist on the exchange floor directly, thus removing 
a boundary. Electronic exchanges make it possible to 
eliminate an exchange floor all together. 
IT enables 24-hour trading. Brokerage firms routinely 
'*pass the bookw on their foreign currency transactions from 
London to New York to Tokyo. A discount broker accepts 
phone trades all night and a computer user can submit trades 
at any time. The trades are not executed until an exchange 
opens, but that may change in future. 
A computer systems* ability to process data at 
extremely high speeds makes it possible to offer products 
that could not have been considered before computerization 
because of the time required for computations, e.g., 
calculating the stock distribution in an indexed fund. 
These capabilities have allowed firms to open new markets 
and respond more effectively to their customers; the 
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technology has enabled firms to develop new trading 
strategies, expanding their markets. 
The Impact of Flexibility 
The IT-based trading systems and the flexibility they 
have brought to firms in the securities industry have had 
three major impacts: 
1. Better customer service. 
Customers have better, faster service and can even 
enter trades themselves through personal computers. 
Conceptually, there is no reason a customer should not 
be able to enter an order directly into the SuperDot 
system bypassing a brokerage firm entirely. 
2. Possible increases in market volatility. 
Has the technology unintentionally facilitated trading 
strategies which adversely affect liquidity and 
volatility? Was there insufficient processing capacity 
in October of 1987? Did information technology provide 
more constraints than it removed? On October 19, 1987 
one portfolio insurer sold $1.7 billion of assets while 
three other firms sold over $800 million each, 
Specialists and others bought $700 million; they could 
not meet the liquidity demands of modern technology 
[27]. There has been some speculation that delays 
caused by insufficient systems1 capacity served to 
buffer the October crash; trades were delayed and price 
discovery was almost impossible at certain times during 
the day [28]. 
3. Possible discouraging effect on individual investors 
Since the crash, individual investors have largely been 
absent from the market [29]. The individual investor 
may perceive that only large firms have the technology 
to provide the needed information for decision making 
and access to various exchanges in order to trade 
efficiently. One unintended consequence of information 
technology in the securities industry may be to drive 
the individual investor out of the market. 
Second-Order Effects and Outcomes 
The securities industry has encountered unanticipated 
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responses to its automation efforts. Certainly, the 
exchanges did not create systems like SuperDot to facilitate 
program trading. As mentioned earlier, the government and 
exchanges felt it necessary to create circuit breakers to 
halt trading when certain limits were exceeded on the NYSE 
and the Chicago markets. While systems like DOT and 
SuperDot were developed partially to convince small 
investors that their orders received the same priority as 
institutions, it is not clear that small investors have 
responded in the manner planned by the exchange. 
The financial industry has faced a number of problems 
in managing technology. For example, brokerage firms 
provide brokers and traders with workstations that supply a 
great deal of information on the markets and customers. 
Managers of the major exchanges must develop technology to 
keep up with other exchanges and with off-exchange 
electronic networks. At the same time, they must be 
sensitive to the existing structure of their own exchange, 
(e.g., the presence of specialists at the New York Stock 
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange). At least one 
firm spent over two years and many millions of dollars 
trying to manage the development of a custom system before 
it terminated the project and signed an agreement to adopt a 
third-party broker workstation. 
What is the net outcome of all of this automation? See 
Table 3. For securities firms, the impact has been clearly 
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< Insert Table 3 > 
positive; they can process more transactions with the same 
or fewer people. The firms have benefited greatly by 
trading for customers and for their own accounts using these 
systems. 
For the individual investor, the net outcome is more 
difficult to determine. Systems like SuperDot help the 
small investor submit his or her order with the same or 
greater priority than an institution. On the other hand, 
the evidence suggests that small investors feel intimidated 
by the high volume institutional and investment company 
trading made possible by IT. 
It is more difficult to determine the impact of IT on 
the market itself. There is some evidence that the 
technology has made a positive contribution to the quality 
of markets; in London after the "Big Bang," there has been 
higher turnover and liquidity and an increase in the depth 
of the market. 
THE IMPACT OF IT ON FLEXIBILITY IN THREE FIRMS 
The analysis in the previous sections, which presents 
evidence for the impact of IT on organizational flexibility 
in two large industries, is at a high level of generality; 
in this section we discuss evidence based on three specific 
firms1 use of IT. 
Discount Stores 
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This organization is a large retailer of a complete 
line of goods from clothing to food to electric appliances. 
The company deals with over 900 suppliers, selling nearly 
80,000 products. Purchasing, which must obtain accurate 
sales information from hundreds of stores, deals with a 
fixed set of suppliers, so the task of purchasing is highly 
structured. The primary information exchanged is price and 
delivery times. 
The company is experimenting with Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI). A primary objective of the technology is 
to reduce costs through reduced error rates. Since volume of 
sales in stores cannot be predicted with accuracy, the 
company must incur inventory carrying costs or risk loss of 
sales because of items out of stock. The solution is to use 
ED1 to help reduce the time for restocking. 
Table 3 shows the expected impact of this technology on 
Discount Stores; ED1 clearly reduces the organizational 
boundaries between Discount and its suppliers. Discount can 
also order at any time during the day. ED1 dramatically 
speeds ordering and should reduce stockouts, allowing the 
firm to respond to customers more quickly by restocking 
popular items. 
Table 2 suggests that Discount Stores has become much 
more dependent on technology as a result of its ED1 efforts, 
and that both the store and its customers have gained. The 
customer should benefit from greater availability of stock, 
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and the store should benefit from rapid reorders of fast- 
moving items and lower inventories. 
Mrs. Fields8 Cookies 
In 1988, Mrs. Fieldst ~ookies, a chain of small retail 
outlets typically found in shopping malls and which sell 
several varieties of cookies and a few other selected food 
items, had approximately 500 retail stores world-wide. 
Stores follow a formula of consistent, uniform quality and 
price regardless of location [30, 311. Mrs. Fieldst Cookies 
has a unique structure: two parallel organizations, one of 
which has a traditional span of control and another which 
has a very high span. 
The traditional hierarchy, formed by 50'0 store 
managers, 105 district sales managers, 17 regional 
directors, four senior regional directors, a vice president 
of operations and finally Debbi Fields, has a span of 
control of about 1:5 [32]. 
The second organization, a formal reporting 
relationship for control purposes, enables 500 store 
managers to report to six store controllers, who report to 
the vice president of operations. The span of control 
between store managers and controllers is 35 to 75: 1, 
representing a very flat organization structure. The 
"humanm side of management at Mrs. Fieldst is through a 
traditional hierarchy; the "numbersw side is a flat 
organization made possible through information technology 
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[30,32]. 
Every shop is wholly-owned by the company rather than 
franchised, and the company is under the strong centralized 
control of Mrs. Fields and her husband. The unique 
organization of Mrs. Fields1 cookies allows the owners 
maximum flexibility in adapting to the changing tastes of 
customers in a "fadw business. 
IT is an integral part of the structure of Mrs. Fields' 
cookies. Each store is connected on-line to a central 
database, and there is extensive mechanization of production 
quotas, sales volumes, etc., based on recent daily sales 
records for each store. In fact, each store is given hourly 
sales projections and reports hourly sales results. All 
ordering of supplies (e.g., chocolate chips) is done 
automatically from the central database with direct delivery 
to the store. 
Each store's product mix, sales quotas, and special 
promotions, are customized by an expert system that adapts 
to hourly sales. The company uses IT for coordination; 
through voice mail and electronic mail so that each store 
manager has direct personal interaction with Mrs. Fields 
herself. Company-wide announcements are frequently 
broadcast to each store by voice mail, significantly 
personalizing the announcement over memos and reports. Each 
manager may send Mrs. Fields electronic messages for 
particular problems and expect a personal response within 
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forty-eight hours. 
As shown in Table 1, IT has allowed Mrs. Fieldst to 
reduce boundaries between stores and headquarters; the 
technology has created an organization structure that feels 
flat despite having many layers of management. It is also 
easy to communicate across time zones using voice and E- 
mail. Through detailed store operational control, the 
technology affects the nature and pace of work, freeing 
personnel for more sales work. Mrs. Fieldst can be more 
responsive to customers; it can change products and product 
mix through the systems running at headquarters and in the 
stores. 
As shown in Table 2, there have been management 
problems at Mrs. Fieldst. Possibly encouraged by the 
success of its technology, the firm expanded rapidly and ran 
into difficulty integrating its acquisition, La Petite 
Boulangerie, with its traditional cookie stores [ 3 3 ] .  While 
Mrs. Fieldst can change its mix o f  cookies easily, the 
original cookie operation is basically a one-product 
business. The firm is also reported to have had 
difficulties with its product and market mix when it entered 
international markets. 
The net outcome from flexible IT at Mrs. FieldsB is 
difficult to evaluate. If the firm solves its expansion and 
control problems, then the net effect could be positive. If 
the firm must be radically restructured, or suffers a major 
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reverse, and IT is believed partially responsible for the 
problems, then the net effect could turn out to be a 
negative. 
E a s t  C o a s t  High Tech 
This company, one of the leading US computer 
manufacturers and well known for its highly matrixed 
organizational structure, performs in a turbulent and highly 
competitive environment. New advances in technology 
frequently cause competitors to change marketing and 
engineering plans radically. In addition, new product 
development times (after research and technology transfer) 
are typically two to three years. 
The organization structure of East Coast High Tech can 
best be described as highly fluid. Reporting relationships 
change frequently and matrix relationships are common. 
Because of the environment and nature of the product, a 
structure which allows for coordination by lateral 
relationships across all parts of the organization (except 
perhaps manufacturing) is required. But, the costs of 
maintaining such an organization are high and, as the number 
of parties requiring contact increases, the needed 
coordination becomes highly complex and time-consuming. 
One of the authors studied a sub-unit of East Coast 
High Tech which is responsible for defining new products in 
a segment of the market relatively new to the company, 
financial services. The sub-unit defines application 
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requirements based on input from industry marketing and 
"sellsw these requirements to engineering groups for 
development. similar groups in the organization compete for 
scarce engineering resources based on their ability to 
convince management of the market for a proposed product. 
Frequently, multiple competing products are under 
development in different parts of the organization. Given 
the structure, there is no formal mechanism for coordinating 
multiple activities. Product groups can take it upon 
themselves to form coalitions to consolidate their resources 
on single rather than multiple products, or to use the 
knowledge gained from coalitions to differentiate and 
justify each product. 
The major IT for East Coast ~ i g h  Tech is an extensive 
data communications network connecting every part of the 
organization across all functions world-wide. The network 
is primarily used for coordination through E-mail and 
computer conferencing. The technology vastly increase the 
number of connections available to employees of the firm. 
Table 1 suggests that the technology at East Coast High Tech 
reduces geographic boundaries; a work group formed despite 
the physical location of the participants. The technology 
lets groups or individuals communicate together at one time 
or asynchronously. The faster communications and project 
completion that result from this technology should increase 
the firm's responsiveness to the market by reducing product 
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development cycle times. 
Table 2 shows that East Coast High Tech has not been 
completely successful in managing complex technology. In 
particular, it has had difficulty diffusing the success of 
the project team described above to other groups in the 
organization. No one in the firm has taken a leadership 
role to further develop the technology. The firm is 
entering a period of extreme stress, making it unlikely that 
what has been learned from this group will be transmitted to 
others. 
The net effect is again hard to determine because the 
organization may "discoverw at some point in the future the 
application and it will diffuse throughout the organization. 
An alternate scenario, most likely at this point, is that 
the organization has learned little from this experiment and 
the net effect will be neutral or negative. 
Impact of Flexibility 
IT has contributed to each of these firms1 flexibility 
in different ways. The systems, and the flexibility they 
offer, have had an impact on each organization. 
1. Discount stores. 
The technology should improve operational efficiency 
and reduce costs. If the firm is able to restock items 
more quickly through ED1 and increase sales, then 
revenues should increase. The combination of reduced 
costs and enhanced revenues means higher profits. 
2. Mrs. Fields1 Cookies. 
The technology has allowed Mrs. Fieldst to structure a 
flat organization structure for control purposes. This 
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use of IT suggests how organizations may be structured 
in the future, substituting computer and communications 
for management layers and supervisory functions. The 
case also serves as a warning that a successful IT 
effort should not be used for unmanaged expansion. 
3. East Coast High Tech. 
This firm's approach to product development has 
resulted in a more fluid organization. Here the impact 
of the technology is to make it easier to form task 
forces that span organizational and physical 
boundaries. Although the experiment with the 
technology was a success, it appears that East Coast 
High Tech may not have learned much from its efforts. 
DISCUSSION 
The technology deployed by the firms and industries 
discussed in the paper has a number of characteristics in 
common. Many of the applications have resulted in better 
customer service and more responsiveness to the market place 
even if that was not their original intention. Airline CRS 
were developed to provide customer service and to make it 
possible for the airlines to cope with growing reservations 
traffic. Brokerage firm back office systems were first 
developed to solve transactionst processing problems; but, 
the data they provided and the improvements they created in 
the operation of the markets also resulted in better service 
for the customer. 
other systems providing flexibility have concentrated 
on reducing cycle times. Electronic order routing systems 
on stock exchange, computerized markets, ED1 at Discount 
stores, and conferencing at East Coast High Tech reduce the 
time it takes to complete a task. Lower cycle times, in 
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turn, make an organization appear more flexible to customers 
and allow it to explore new markets. 
All of the systems offer improved access to data. 
These firms have often replaced paper documents with 
electronic data, paper becomes the second choice to 
displaying data on a screen. Even if the data were 
originally captured to improve transactions processing, the 
organizations described in this paper have recognized that 
these data, which have been made available to many employees 
within the firm and to external organizations through 
communications links, have value for other purposes. 
It is interesting to note that the technology involved 
in most of these systems has been available for a number of 
years. These systems rely on on-line, fast response 
systems, database management, and communications networks. 
Changes in technology have reduced costs and increased the 
capabilities of computers and communications, making it 
feasible to apply these core technologies to developing 
systems that increase flexibility. 
The model in Figure 1 suggests that IT can also 
decrease flexibility. Open systems, fourth generation 
languages, and database management systems all help to 
reduce rigidity. Few, however, would argue that it is easy 
to make major changes in computer and communications 
systems. Until such technology is available, firms will 
still face a paradox: systems they design to create overall 
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flexibility are, themselves, often inflexible and difficult 
to change. 
IMPLICATIONS 
The evidence suggests that IT can influence 
organizational flexibility. ~lexibility helps a firm react 
. 
to the marketplace and to the actions of other firms and can 
contribute to competitiveness. How can organizations 
design systems and use technology to increase flexibility? 
On an operational level, senior management must be 
involved in setting technology strategy, goals, and 
implementation, as was done by Randy and Debbie Fields and 
Robert Crandall at American Airlines. Applications like E- 
mail, EDI, and voice mail require senior management to take 
a major role in implementation. The experience of East 
Coast Hi Tech shows how a lack of leadership can 
substantially reduce the benefits of technology. Managers 
also need to be open to new ideas and the use of outside 
parties to build and integrate new technology [18]. 
One of the most difficult tasks for management is 
investing in building an infrastructure, like a world-wide 
communications network, when there may be no immediate 
payoff [34]. Yet, without an infrastructure, the firm is 
not in a position to react quickly when an opportunity 
arises. An infrastructure is necessary to take advantage 
of the flexibility offered by technology. 
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Management must also be aware of the second-order 
effects from the application of IT to increase flexibility. 
Because most organizations are becoming more dependent on 
technology, they must ensure they have adequate staff and 
knowledge in the organization to implement and maintain 
technology. One cannot always forecast the reaction to a 
new technology, but management must be sensitive to 
unanticipated responses and be ready to deal with them. 
Finally, the firm must be able to manage the increased 
complexity that comes from the deployment of more and more 
information technology. In at least two of the cases, it 
appears that management has not been completely successful 
in coping with and learning from the technology. 
As the IT designer also inevitably designs at least 
some parts of the organization, the designer of IT must 
consider the impact of the technology on the organization as 
well as on the particular task for which the technology is 
intended. Management should consider information 
technology as a major variable in the design of the 
organization and think about how IT can contribute to 
effectiveness. 
Increasingly, the design of organizations will involve 
specifying the type of information technology the 
organization needs to employ. For example, Hopper [I83 and 
Drucker [353 suggested that IT will change hierarchical 
organizational structures into networks of task forces and 
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problem solvers. Technology can contribute to creating the 
organizational structure desired by management, and in some 
cases technology may be what makes a particular structure 
possible. 
One theme for the 1990s is competitiveness; 
organizational flexibility can contribute to competitiveness 
by helping the organization react more quickly to the 
marketplace and take advantage of new opportunities. One 
challenge for management in the 1990s is to take advantage 
of information technology to increase organizational 
flexibility. 
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1. Increase time, effort, cost 
to change systems 
2,lncrease time, effort, cost 




1 Alter time & place of work 
2 Change nature and pace 
3 Respond quickly 
lnformation Technology & 





Negative I. Technological dependence 
2. Unanticipated responses 
Decreased 3.Management complexity 
, Flexibility , 
Second-Order 
Effects Outcome 
Organization and System Key Sources of Data 
Airline CRS 1 Copeland and McKenney 1988 ( 6 )  
I Diverse news stories 
Securities firms and industry 1 Lucas and Schwartz, 1989 ( 2 2 ,  23) 
Data Sources 
Table 1 
Discount Stores ED1 
Mrs. Fields Cookies: E- mail,^ voice 
mail and store control 
East Coast High Tech 
teleconferencinq 
Allen and Zarernbo, ' 1989 ( 1 )  
Wood 1989 (40) 
Reuters Case 1988 (29) 
Field research 
Harvard Case, 1989 (12) 
Harvard Note, 1992 (13) 
Richman, 1987 (31) 
Field research 
Nature  & Pace Responsiveness  
O r g a n i z a t i o n  Boundar ies  Time of  Work t o  Market  
A i r l i n e  CRS S t a g e  1 
A i r l i n e  CRS S t a g e  2  
S e c u r i t i e s  f i r m  back 
o f f  i c e  
Organizal t ional  F l e x i b i l i t y  i n  
Two I n d u s t r i e s  and Three  Firms 
Tab le  2  
Remove boundary o f  
manual c e n t r a l i z e d  
p r o c e s s i n g ;  make 
r e s e r v a t i o n  any 
p l a c e  
Boundary f o r  making 
r e s e r v a t i o n  s h i f t s  t o  
a g e n t  from a i r l i n e ;  
a i r p o r t  b o a r d i n g  p a s s  
S e ~ ~ r l t i e s  i n d u s t r y  
t r a d i n g  a t  exchanges 
and member f i r m s  
Discount  S t o r e s  E D 1  
M r s .  F i e l d s  Cookies:  
E-mail, v o i c e  m a i l  
and s t o r e  c o n t r o l  
E a s t  C o a s t  High Tech 
t e l e c o n f e r e n c i n g  
pnoved t o  t r a v e l  
h a k e  d a t a  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  b r o k e r s  o n - l i n e  
'Make r e s e r v a t i o n s  any 
t ime 
f o r  s e a t s  
Ex t ra  s e r v i c e  by 
a g e n t ,  e . g . >  24- hour  
a s s i s t a n c e  
Able  t o  r o u t e  o r d e r s  
w i t h o u t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
of  f l o o r  b r o k e r ;  
f l o o r  becomes an 
e x t e n s i o n  of  
b rokerage  of  £ i c e ;  
may remove need f o r  
f l o o r ,  e .  g  . , NASDAQ, 
London S tock  Exchange 
Reduce boundary w i t h  
s u p p l i e r s  
Br ing s t o r e s  c l o s e r  
t o  h e a d q u a r t e r s ;  
c r e a t e  f l a t  s t r u c t u r e  
f o r  c o n t r o l  
Reduce g e o g r a p h i c  
b o u n d a r i e s  
E l imina te  need t o  
c l o s e  exchanges 
Confirmed r e s e r v a t i o n s  
made i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y  
T r a v e l  agen t  becomes 
more p r o d u c t i v e  
Movement toward 24" 
hour  t r a d i n g ;  p a s s i n g  
t h e  book around t h e  
world f o r  c u r r e n c y :  
NYC t o  London t o  
Tokyo; t r a d e  any t i m e  
Order a t  any t ime  . 
Communicate a c r o s s  
t ime  zones 
Communicate a s  a  
group o r  
asynchronously  
A l t e r  s c h e d u l e s  
i n  r esponse  t o  l o a d s  
Y i e l d  management 
programs a l l o w  
i n s t a n t a n e o u s  
a d j u s t m e n t  t o  demand 
G r e a t l y  speed 
e a r l y p r o c e s s i n g  of t r a d e s  
C r e a t e  new p r o d u c t s  
and s e r v i c e s  
Able  t o  execu te  t r a d i n g  
d e c i s i o n s  
i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y  
I n c r e a s e  speed o f  
o r d e r i n g ;  r educe  
s t o c k o u t s  
Automate m i c r o - l e v e l  
management of  s t o r e ;  
f r e e  pe r sonne l  f o r  
s a l e s  
F a s t e r  communications 
and p r o j e c t  complet ion 
Enable new i n v e s t m e n t  
s t r a t e g i e s  
Respond q u i c k l y  t o  
cus tomer  demand 
Change p r o d u c t  mix 
and compos i t ion  i n  
e n t i r e  c h a i n  h o u r l y  
based  on demand 
P o t e n t i a l  t o  r educe  
p r o d u c t  development 
c y c l e  t i m e s  
Depend totally on highly 
centralized computer and 
communications network 





I Technological Dependence: 
Passenger: 
CRS Vendor .' 
Mixed;- greater convenience, victim 
of yield management, hub systems 
Airline Non-CRS Vendor: 
I Government and investor concerns Positive-trading profits I 
Securities Industry 
I Managemen t Complexity: I Exchanges : I 
Managing rapidly changing I Positive-maintain market share 1 
Unanticipated Response: 
technology; coping with large 
number of institutions and 
constituents 
Extremely negative; barriers to 
entry 
Securities Firms : 
Technological Dependence l 
I Much more dependent after ED1 
Individual Investor: 




I I Encouraged expansion beyond I Net positive if control restored 
Mrs. Fields' Cookies 
Firm: 
Management Complexity: 
East Coast High Tech 
Positive-efficiency 
Firm : 
ability to manage 
Management Complexity. 
Second-Order Effects and Outcomes 
From Using IT 
Table 3 
Learn from experience and diffuse 
the innovation 
Net negative? Little 
organizational learning 
